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The return to tradition is a myth…the search 
for identity, for a model …[is] ahead of us, 
never in the past — it’s a permanent process of 
renewal … . Our identity is ahead of us.
Jean-Marie Tjibaou, 1985. Interview: Facing  
our Identity, Les temps modernes 464, March.
Introduction
On 11 May 2014, New Caledonia elected its fourth, 
and final, local Congress under the historic 1998 
Noumea Accord. 
There was no Australian media coverage of that 
election, nor of a violent protest at the end of May 
just out of Noumea, when Kanak protesters shot and 
injured two French gendarmes. Indeed, few Austral-
ians are aware that our closest neighbour just two 
hours flying time off the east coast of Queensland is 
France, in its Pacific possession, New Caledonia. 
One reason for this is that the French, along 
with the local pro-France and pro-independence 
groups who were engaged in a bloody civil war 
only 25 years ago, successfully negotiated a series 
of agreements ending the violence of the 1980s 
and postponing a sensitive self-determination vote 
in return for a promised schedule of handovers of 
responsibilities by 2014. These agreements, the 1988 
Matignon/Oudinot Accords and the 1998 Noumea 
Accord, have so far presided over a long period of 
peace and prosperity, keeping the French collectivity 
out of the regional and Australian newspapers.
But time is up. The Noumea Accord provides that 
a self-determination referendum process must now 
be held, between 2014 and 2018. The newly elected 
Congress can decide by 3/5 majority to proceed to a 
referendum process. If a decision cannot be reached, 
the French State is obliged to initiate it by 2018.
No one group holds 3/5 of the Congress. Given 
the balance of forces in the Congress, the 3/5 require-
ment demands co-operation between supporters 
and opponents of independence. The recent elec-
tion showed that, while the pro-France groups retain 
the majority (29 of 54 seats), the pro-independence 
groups with 25 seats have won more representation 
than ever before, and the pro-France groups less, a 
continuation of the trend since 1998. Since the elec-
torate for any referendum process is broader than 
that for the Congress, and is as yet untested, the out-
look for the future in this collectivity where blood 
was shed as recently as 25 years ago, is uncertain and 
fragile. Indeed, the fragility and divisions remaining 
in New Caledonia are shown by the violence result-
ing in the above-mentioned shooting of two French 
police by Kanak protesters just weeks after the elec-
tions, and in another incident in early June 2014 
when a senior pro-independence political adviser 
was shot in a drunken brawl involving pro-inde-
pendence Kanak figures. On 19 July 2014 the most 
senior French official in New Caledonia resigned his 
post as High Commissioner over issues related to the 
future of New Caledonia.1
Given that politics in New Caledonia essen-
tially have revolved around support for independ-
ence or for staying with France, with fragmenta-
tion in recent years within each camp, my objec-
tive is to look, not as an anthropologist, but as a 
political analyst, at the progression of concepts of 
indigenous ethnic identity and nationalism in New 
Caledonia within the context of French colonisa-
tion, which is how such concepts crystallised and 
continue to evolve there. I focus particularly on 
the articulation of these concepts in the 1970s and 
80s by the Kanak independence leader, Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou, an articulation which represented a turn-
ing point for the people of New 
Caledonia, both Kanak and non-
Kanak. His view of Kanak identity 
is based on a core ethic defined 
by the answers to the questions 
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‘Where do we come from? Who are we? Where are 
we going?’ His answers, the first recorded coherent 
public articulation by a prominent Kanak leader, 
shaped the Accords themselves and continue to 
influence the post-Accord future of New Caledonia 
— particularly, as will be shown, two major discus-
sion papers, one prepared by the French and one by 
Kanak chiefs, over the last twelve months. Because 
what happens in New Caledonia will impact inevi-
tably on other parts of the Pacific, particularly 
Melanesia, but also certainly French Polynesia, it is 
arguable that Tjibaou’s views have broad relevance 
to the South Pacific as a whole.
First, some definitions. In my paper today, the 
term ‘Kanak’ refers to the indigenous people of New 
Caledonia, all of whom are Melanesian, who speak 
about 28 different languages and who are located 
throughout the archipelago. Until the 1970s, the 
French used the term ‘Melanesian’ to refer to the 
indigenous people of New Caledonia; it was only 
by 1983, at a meeting at Nainville-les Roches, that 
France specifically recognised the ‘Kanak people’, 
only formalised in the 1998 Noumea Accord. The 
idea of one term ‘ethnic identity’ for such peoples 
seems fairly inadequate, but such complexity is not 
new, Phinney and Ong (2007) noting the multi-
dimensional nature of ‘ethnic identity’, as Tajfel 
(1981) defines it: ‘that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from [his] knowledge of [his] 
membership of a social group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significance attached 
to that membership’ (cited in Phinne and Ong 2007, 
255), and which others have seen as closely linked 
with culture (Nagel 1994, Linnekin 1990).
The term ‘Caldoche’ loosely refers to those 
European (French) settlers who arrived from the 
early 19th century and who form today the bulk of 
the long-term non-Kanak residents in New Caledo-
nia. The term ‘French’ refers to those sometimes 
dubbed ‘metros’ or more pejoratively, ‘zoreilles’ or 
‘zozos’ (from the term ‘les oreilles’ or ‘ears’, implying 
that they are spying on the locals) who are posted 
by the sovereign French state to administer New 
Caledonia, who generally stay two to three years; 
those French experts who have come periodically 
and temporarily to advise and work on the exploita-
tion of the nickel resource with which the collectiv-
ity is generously endowed; and includes also those 
relatively recent arrivals who have retired there 
responding to attractive French pension arrange-
ments to entice them to do so. There are in addition 
a number of minorities including Wallisians, Indo-
nesians, Vietnamese, and ni-Vanuatu. Understand-
ing these various layers of peoples in the French 
sovereign territory of New Caledonia is fundamen-
tal to notions of ethnicity in New Caledonia.
Because history brought the French to New 
Caledonia, the development of a sense of ethnic 
identity, for the indigenous people there, has 
necessarily been tied up with their relationship 
with European newcomers to their archipelago. 
Without the benefit of the written Kanak word, our 
understanding of the early aspects of their identity 
comes from others. I propose to skate lightly 
over earliest perceptions of Kanak ethnic identity, 
principally because these have been long recorded 
and are exclusively written by foreigners. For a 
good, fairly recent review of the earliest perceptions 
of the British and French arrivals, including the 
first-hand reports of the explorers, see Bullard 2000 
on which I draw below.
The Past
The British Captain Cook was the first European to 
sight the coast of the archipelago in 1774. He saw the 
local people as welcoming and friendly, with their 
own languages and culture. One record describes the 
British drawing a line in the sand in order to protect 
themselves from being touched by the locals. One 
Kanak then drew a circle entirely around himself, 
apparently with great good humour (Bullard 2000, 
30). The message of self-protection was clear. 
The French who arrived twenty years later 
under Captain D’Entrecasteaux, had a more hostile 
impression, with Captain Rossel recording a war-
mongering and unattractive people, casting them as 
the ‘ignoble savage’ (Kohler 1991, 41). Throughout 
the 18th and 19th centuries, the various perspec-
tives of the French missionaries, administrators and 
settlers consolidated this fundamental image:
•      for missionaries (who arrived in 1843) and 
administrators, the indigenous people were to 
be redeemed, by the civilizing mission of France 
and all it stood for (Bullard 2000, 38)
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm                                                                                                 3 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2014/4
•     for colonists, the native was ‘the obstructor, 
monopolizing land, a laborer destined to die 
out’ (Saussol 1979).
The experience of encroachment by both groups 
alienated the indigenous people and set off a cycle 
of rebellion and domination. An early example was 
missionary behavior after having negotiated the use 
of land to cultivate yams after their arrival. The yam 
is a plant sacred to the Kanaks. The missionaries 
harvested the entire crop, only to be robbed of it by 
the Kanaks who were thereafter marked as thieves 
(Bullard 2000, 40). Discontent mounted, and the 
missionaries were routed by 1847. 
French officials landing in 1851 arrived to a 
hostile reception. Formal annexation was declared 
in 1853. The ‘civilising mission’ of the administra-
tors was encapsulated in the contract they conclud-
ed with Kanak leaders in 1854 granting French citi-
zenship in return for ‘regeneration and civilization’ 
by the French.
As the French encroached on their lands, and 
with the confinement of Kanaks to cantonments 
from 1876, Kanak discontent gathered momentum 
and resulted in an uprising led by Chief Atai in 
1878, and another under Chief Noel in 1917, both 
firmly quelled by the French, who saw the upris-
ings as revolts against ‘civilization’ (Bullard 2000, 
47). From 1887 the indigénat system was enforced, 
confining Kanaks to reserves, imposing a per head 
tax, circumscribing their freedom of movement and 
requiring them to perform free labour. Kanaks were 
often ‘blackbirded’ or pressed into labour aboard 
foreign ships and plantations elsewhere in the Pacif-
ic. The French themselves appointed chiefs, often 
without regard to customary authority figures.
Moving forward to the two World Wars, images 
about the Kanaks continue to be second-hand. The 
Kanaks fought in both wars to defend the interests 
of the French. Heavy-handed colonial war recruit-
ment practices in World War I contributed to the 
Kanak insurrection in 1917 (comprehensively writ-
ten about by Adrian Muckle in Muckle 2014). Mau-
rice Leenhardt, a French pastor and ethnologist 
in New Caledonia from 1902 to 1927, studied and 
recorded aspects of Kanak culture, and learned the 
Houailou language. On his arrival the French mayor 
asked why he had come to evangelise the local peo-
ple as ‘In ten years, there will be not a Canaque left’ 
(Leenhardt 1922, 5). From his careful writings, pub-
lished in the 1930s, valuable knowledge about the 
Kanak culture was recorded. His writings were sym-
pathetic and relatively dispassionate, and drew on 
direct inputs from the indigenous people he inter-
viewed, but his accounts were nonetheless those of 
an observer outside the culture, and of an observer 
with a particular religious perspective towards those 
he interviewed (reviewed in Clifford 1980).
Meanwhile the Kanaks were again recruited to 
fight for the French in World War II, when they 
saw once again that their proud colonial masters 
were fallible and could suffer defeat (Waddell 2008, 
38 and Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992, 67). After 
1940, when the Americans arrived in great num-
bers in New Caledonia to set up their base for the 
Pacific campaign there, the Kanaks were exposed 
to the idea that there were other white people who 
worked with, respected, and paid blacks in their 
ranks, albeit on a basis of segregation — and this 
strengthened nascent consciousness of their iden-
tity as a group, and of rights.
Interest from white settlers in more autonomy 
dates from 1932, and was renewed, abortively, 
amidst the disarray surrounding the installation of 
a Gaullist administration in Noumea in 1940. But it 
was from the missionaries that political groupings 
first emerged in 1946, when French citizenship (but 
not yet the universal right to vote)2 was extended 
to some of its overseas residents, and when the 
discriminatory indigénat scheme came to an end. 
In 1946 two groups were formed, each encompass-
ing both indigenous and Caldoches, one Catholic 
(UICALO) and the other Protestant (AICLF). Both 
groups united in 1953 into the first political party, 
the Union Calédonienne, with the motto ‘two col-
ours, one united people’, a party that remains prom-
inent on the political scene today (see Kurtovich 
1997). Ethnic identity was not the basis of these 
early groupings.
By 1956, in the Defferre loi cadre, France was 
legislating for self-determination, autonomy and 
even independence of its overseas territories, and 
had granted the vote to all ‘native’ residents over-
seas. In a 1958 referendum the Pacific territories 
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voted to stay within France, but within an environ-
ment of increasing autonomy. However, with all 
but one of the African territories independent by 
1960, and under pressure from the Caldoches, by 
1963 France began to roll back the powers it had 
devolved to the local council (Jacquinot Law). Over 
the 1960s further restrictions were imposed, in 
part to maintain French control of the increasingly 
lucrative exploitation of New Caledonia’s nickel 
resource (Billotte Law).3 Moreover, as the nickel 
boom peaked from 1969 to 1972, large numbers of 
French experts arrived in the territory, and the local 
people were employed in more menial roles. The 
Kanaks, their relative numbers reduced by inflows 
from the métropole, reacted thereafter by increas-
ingly strident demands for independence (in 1975 
by Yann Uregei and the Union Multiraciale, and in 
1977 by the Union Caledonienne). 
At this time, the 1970s, pro-independence 
indigenous leaders revived the term ‘Kanak’ to iden-
tify themselves (Kasarerhou and Boulay 2013, 10), 
drawing on the term ‘canaque’, which had been used 
by Captain Cook in 1774 to refer to indigenous 
Hawai‘ian peoples. At the same time, the French 
State was overtly encouraging French migration 
specifically to outnumber the indigenous people 
and head off mounting indigenous nationalism.4 
By the early 1970s too, in response to the arrival of 
thousands of newcomers, a sense of common cause 
emerged between some Caldoches and Kanaks as 
they faced similar pressures on their employment 
and conditions from the well-paid newcomers. 
Still, to this time, most of these images of the 
Kanaks remain secondary, derived from other’s 
perceptions and experience of them. As nickel min-
ing intensified, to the early images of hostility and 
‘savagery’ of the indigenous people now were added 
perceptions of reluctance to work and laziness as 
the mines employed Kanaks typically in the lowest 
positions.
The Present of Tjibaou
It was in this environment that Kanak independ-
ence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou emerged. A former 
Catholic priest, he came from the French mission-
ary tradition with all that that entailed: on the one 
hand, he understood and could proficiently use the 
language of the French; and, as a customary chief 
himself, he experienced first-hand and the more 
acutely, the French perceptions of the indigenous 
people and saw their effect on his people. 
Tjibaou was the first Kanak leader who saw it as 
necessary and worthwhile to explain what it meant 
to be Kanak, and who had the skill and the will to 
articulate elements of Kanak culture and identity. 
In 1987 in a booklet of his coalition, the FLNKS 
(Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste, 
or Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front), he 
wrote that ‘whereas the colonial endeavour has been 
to make our people lose their identity by alienating 
them from their history and expunging the evidence 
of it’ the booklet ‘will have its place in the creation 
of the written memory which will allow the new 
people of Kanaky to know about themselves and to 
create for themselves a self-image which is deeply 
rooted but new, satisfying and heroic’ (Tjibaou 
2005, xxxix). He acknowledged the role of Maurice 
Leenhardt in recording aspects of Kanak culture, 
telling the University of Geneva in 1981 that ‘It was 
fortunate for us that he wrote’ (78).5
He was a rare Kanak, too, in wanting to edu-
cate non-Kanaks about Kanak culture, and in his 
acknowledgement of the rights of non-Kanaks 
in relationships based on mutual respect (other 
Kanaks in this tradition include Rock and Raphael 
Pidjot, and Eloi Machoro, see Mokaddem 2011). 
In his words and writings, he laid the concilia-
tory foundation stone on which the dialogue and 
acceptance of the 1988 and 1998 accords was to 
be built; and, I would argue, on which the post-
Accords period will be based. 
1970s and early 1980s
His first effort to show what it was to be Kanak 
was in 1975 when he collaborated to stage a major 
event called Melanesia 2000, bringing together 
2000 Melanesians from all over the archipelago 
in a cultural experience to celebrate Kanak iden-
tity. He described the Festival as a ‘commercial’ on 
Kanak culture for the White world, and to awaken 
the Kanak people to their own heritage (Tjibaou 
2005, 11). Talking later about the Festival, he says 
he saw it ‘as one means of overcoming the insignifi-
cance we suffered then, when the whole environ-
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm                                                                                                 5 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2014/4
ment was set up to alienate the Kanak, who existed 
only through his relationship with the White, and 
in which all the images he gets of himself are nega-
tive’ (243). His wife, Marie-Claude, referring to the 
numerous clans involved, describes it as a ‘unity in 
diversity’ experience.6 The whole event was under-
written by the French authorities, who sent repre-
sentatives and participated. But the settler Caldoche 
stayed away. A counterpart Caledonia 2000 Festival 
to focus on their culture never took place (275).
By this time, the French continued to roll back 
powers they had devolved on New Caledonia, and 
nationalist moves by the Kanaks had gathered pace. 
The unity of the Union Calédonienne broke down. 
Palika (Parti de libération Kanak, or Kanak Libera-
tion Party) was founded in 1976 from the Foulards 
Rouges movement and the ex-student left; and the 
FULK (Front Uni de Libération Kanak, or United 
Kanak Liberation Front), was formed from Uregei’s 
Union Multiraciale (surveyed in Chappell 2013). 
Tjibaou remained at the head of the UC, which 
by 1977 was calling for independence. Pro-France 
Caldoches in turn broke away from the UC and in 
1978 formed the RPCR (Rassemblement Pour la 
Calédonie dans la République, or Rally for [New] 
Caledonia within the Republic), under Jacques 
Lafleur. After an initial conciliatory Statute (Stirn 
1976) the French further tightened control (Loi 
Dijoud 1978), driving the unification of pro-inde-
pendence parties into the FI (Front Indépendan-
tiste, or Independence Front) headed by Tjibaou. 
By the 1980s, violence had erupted between the 
principally Kanak pro-independence supporters 
and pro-France loyalists. Blood was shed on both 
sides and positions hardened. 
During this time, within this highly politi-
cal context, as independence demands mounted, 
Tjibaou made a further contribution to defining 
Kanak identity through three key writings: the first 
an article written with Philippe Missotte before the 
Melanesia 2000 Festival in 1975; the second, an 
article in the Journal de la Société des océanistes in 
1976; and the third a presentation to the University 
of Geneva in 1981. Tjibaou set out cultural elements 
fundamental to Kanak identity, such as the signifi-
cance and sacredness of the yam; the role of the 
father in bestowing social status and land; and of 
the mother in giving life and blood (Tjibaou 2005, 
78). But he also elaborated on further principles of 
Kanak life and identity, which were at the basis of 
Kanak political demands and linked to European 
lack of understanding of these principles, viz.: 
•     the ‘ethic’, or cultural inspiration, which is the 
reply to the questions ‘who are we? where do 
we come from? where are we going?’ (31),7 with 
corresponding ideas of time in relationship to 
the seasons and the rhythm of nature (86); of 
death and of history as not linear but successive 
layers of events (46) 
•     the strong identification with the land, which 
is ‘patrimony’, and ‘archives’ (82–83) ‘We do 
not come from elsewhere. We are people of and 
from this land’ (76) ‘A clan which loses its terri-
tory … loses its personality’ (42)
•     the idea of prestige coming from giving, rather 
than acquiring (78)
•     the importance of the parole as sacred (21), or the 
word of honour, which is identical with action (60)
•     the fact of any Kanak existing only in terms of 
relationships, by reference to others (78).
He sometimes specifically presented these facets 
of Kanak identity as explaining popular European 
stereotypes, for example, in relation to the non-
linear aspect of time and history, the pace of Kanak 
life and European images of the Kanak work ethic. 
By explaining the nature of the Kanak attachment 
to land, and the importance of the link between 
word and action, he was setting up bases for future 
negotiation. At the same time, he cautioned about 
the idea of ‘custom’ which he saw as a European 
word imposed on ideas they did not understand. 
Drawing on the fundamental idea of the 
Kanak existing only ‘by reference to’ others, with 
the implicit hurtfulness of the way Europeans had 
related to them, Tjibaou nonetheless took pains to 
build on an idea of inclusion that was remarkable in 
the context of the dissension around him. In 1978, 
acknowledging the role of the non-Kanak Indone-
sian, Wallisian and Tahitian populations, his UC 
espoused ‘an obligation to rethink the legal status of 
people and their property…the status of the culture 
within...each group’. In a 1981 interview, talking 
about independence, he says ‘Other peoples with 
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another way of life will be able to stay if they accept 
that we run the country’ (Tjibaou 2005, 91). By 
1982 he was expanding on this idea: ‘We want rec-
ognition of this people first, and of its right to claim 
the independence of its country…To be nationalist 
is not to be racist’. 
Arguably it was this enunciation of the 
Kanak identity with its ideas of relationships and 
inclusivity that led, in 1983, to the French directly 
acknowledging, at an historic meeting with both 
the pro-France and pro-independence parties 
at Nainville-les-Roches, ‘the innate and active 
right to independence of the Kanak people’, while 
Kanak leaders acknowledged longstanding New 
Caledonian settler communities as ‘victims of 
history’ with the right to participate in a vote of self-
determination, a right not accorded to more recent 
arrivals (Tjibaou 2005, 251). This fundamental 
recognition did not culminate in an agreement 
at the time, but was to result in the success of the 
historic Matignon and Noumea Accords years later. 
1980s
The civil disturbances continued after Nainville-les-
Roches, intensifying in opposition to yet another 
French Statute (Lemoine 1984), when the pro-
independence group boycotted 1984 elections. 
Here ethnic identity, the Kanak people as a political 
construct, was clearly at the heart of the political 
objective, when Tjibaou declared the independ-
ent state of Kanaky. Shortly afterwards in a bloody 
massacre at his home town Hienghene two of his 
brothers were killed. French Statutes came thick 
and fast (Pisani and Fabius 1985, Pons I 1986, Pons 
II 1988) but could not resolve the fundamental 
differences between the pro-French and pro-inde-
pendence movements, the latter principally but not 
entirely Kanak, pointing to increasing identity of 
interests between the more long-term Caldoches 
and the Kanaks.8 Finally, tensions came to a head 
in early1988, midway through French presidential 
election rounds, when the French made a heavy-
handed, bloody response to Kanaks taking French 
police hostage in a cave on the island of Ouvea.
Tjibaou’s language at this time, not surpris-
ingly, becomes increasingly nationalist. Declaring 
the provisional government of Kanaky in 1984, he 
said ‘independence means: ‘This is Kanak country.’ 
Kanak sovereignty, the sovereignty of this country, 
belongs to the Kanaks and to no-one else …  . We 
demand primacy in this country because it is our 
country’ (Tjibaou 2005, 138–41). From 1985 the 
UC slogan changed from ‘Two colours, one people’ 
to ‘Acknowledge the Kanak people that it in turn 
might acknowledge you’. ‘What is Kanak identity? 
Why a Kanak independence? These questions take 
us to the core of Kanak society — its culture’ and 
again [on culture and identity] ‘We can’t put one 
before the other, they go together in this struggle of 
ours’(168, 180). The blending of independence and 
Kanak identity is complete by 1988, when he says, 
‘accession to sovereignty is our top priority, a mat-
ter of national identity’ (232).
He refines the idea of Kanak identity, princi-
pally in building on the idea of indigenous rights. 
This is a prescient stance, foreshadowing the Unit-
ed Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples which was finalised only in 2007, years 
after his death. Of course, Tjibaou situates the dec-
laration of the Provisional Government of Kanaky 
within the UN decolonisation processes at the time. 
He refers to the rejection by the French govern-
ment of ‘article 1514 of the United Nations Charter, 
under which the Kanak people can be considered 
as an indigenous people with the right to decolo-
nisation’ (Tjibaou 2005, 159). However, he moves 
beyond this idea of a simple self-determination 
mechanism for indigenous people. He notes that 
‘we have to agree on what the act of self-determina-
tion means; it can’t be something scheduled every 
four, five, even every 10 years. It is a once only 
thing’ and calls for ‘discussion first on the concept 
of self-determination’ (229). He notes that losing 
any independence referendum ‘does not destroy the 
Kanaks’ right to independence, because this right 
is inherent in their status as the indigenous people’ 
(107). ‘The claim for independence belongs to the 
Kanak people, to the legitimate, indigenous people’ 
(113). ‘Every Kanak born is born with the right to 
independence, which is not the case for the French’ 
(231). ‘The fact of the Kanaks as the first inhabit-
ants must be taken seriously’ (228). This kind of 
language is reflected in the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, a potential tool for 
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the Kanak people to further their interests as the 
current post-Accord discussions proceed (as evi-
denced in the Kanak Charter, see below).
Even at this politically charged time, Tjibaou’s 
ideas are not exclusive, but leave room for change 
and compromise. In 1985, he says ‘The return to 
tradition is a myth … the search for identity, for a 
model…[is] ahead of us, never in the past — it’s a 
permanent process of renewal … . Our identity is 
ahead of us’(160).
His ideas are inclusive even of the Caldoches. 
He proposes a ‘referendum on self-determination’ 
for colonised peoples alone, but ‘what we ask …is 
that the right of the Kanak people to the mastery 
of their own destiny be recognised … . It is a mat-
ter of recognising the legitimacy of the indigenous 
people in their own country, their whole sovereign 
identity. Once their sovereignty is recovered, they 
can exercise their right to admit others, and they 
can discuss matters as partners with governments 
of goodwill’ (108); ‘… the indigenous people who 
are not prepared to tolerate imposed systems any 
longer, …. want to control their own destiny, that is, 
to establish a system with the others, if the others 
agree’ (206).
His ideas of independence too evolve. While 
Tjibaou was clearly talking of independence at 
the time, the language he used provided space for 
the accommodation and compromise ahead in 
the Matignon and Noumea Accords. As such, this 
kind of language paved the way for a future status 
of New Caledonia that is not necessarily that of an 
independent sovereign territory. The essence of 
independence for Kanaks, he said, flowing from 
their identity involving reference to others, is being 
able to choose with whom they would like to relate. 
As early as 1979 he referred to countries who ‘seek 
to establish relationship systems which make them 
dependent on other countries but place them in a 
system which safeguards their national independ-
ence. This right to choose with whom we shall be 
interdependent, politically and economically, is 
one of our fundamental demands’ (Tjibaou 2005, 
66). ‘Independence, for us, is the right to choose 
the partners with whom we want to work’ (141), 
where the right to control immigration, ‘the right to 
decide whom we shall welcome’ was fundamental 
(142). Later, in 1984, he expanded: ‘Sovereignty is 
the right to choose partners; independence is the 
power to manage all the needs that colonisation, 
the present system, has created. We have an ongo-
ing need for the restitution of the Kanak people’s 
sovereignty over their land — sovereignty over 
men, over the land, what is under the ground, the 
airspace, the sea, etc.’ ‘Sovereignty gives us the right 
and the power to negotiate interdependencies. For 
a small country like ours, independence is choosing 
our interdependencies skilfully’ (150). The idea of 
building a new relationship with France based on 
equality remains an important basis for the discus-
sions currently under way in New Caledonia.
He identifies as another element of independ-
ence closely tied with identity, ideas of economic 
expertise and power. On the returns of the nickel 
revenues: ‘if the country holds the heritage, it has 
the power to decide what use is made of it’ (Tjibaou 
2005, 67). In 1987 he wrote: ‘At the moment, the 
Kanak world is on the fringe of the economy. We 
have to emerge from marginalization…It has been 
pointed out to us…that no colony has won its 
independence through economic expertise. But is 
the lack of examples a reason not to try this path?’ 
(215). This idea provided room for time for Kanaks 
to acquire economic expertise.
His ideas of inclusiveness of other non-Kanak 
residents also evolve in the 1980s. In 1985 he 
writes, ‘Those who are prepared, as Cook was, to 
acknowledge us and make custom could eventu-
ally, if they want to take it that far, gain Kanak 
nationality. But above all, whether citizens or not, 
if they live in the Kanaks’ country he will be living 
in Kanaky. It’s about history, the search for dignity 
and the acknowledgement of our people’ (Tjibaou 
2005, 178). By 1988, he says ‘we are open about 
the future with those who are French nationals or 
those who would like to adopt Kanak national-
ity’ (233). He refers in quite specific terms to an 
independence vote including ‘all those affected by 
the fait colonial [fact of colonialism]. So all those 
born in the country who are over 18 years old and 
have at least one parent born in the Territory …
those who voted in 1951 … It doesn’t cover those 
who have just arrived.’ ‘The fait colonial..involve 
[sic]Kanaks and those colonists who made them 
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suffer colonisation. They are the ones who must 
decide on independence through a free act of self-
determination’; ‘Guarantees must be given to those 
who don’t come under the act of self-determination 
and to all French citizens wanting to live in the 
country without losing their citizenship. At the 
same time, a definite cut-off date must be given for 
those who would like to acquire the new national-
ity. Those who decline it will have a resident’s per-
mit with certain privileges; a special status could 
be envisaged for French citizens in our country. 
All this should be determined along with the act 
of self-determination and the Constitution’ (230). 
These ideas are as relevant today as New Caledonia 
defines its future, as they were influential then.
After the debacle of the Ouvea cave massacre, 
the re-elected French President Mitterrand author-
ised a special mission to New Caledonia which 
resulted in the successful negotiation of the Mat-
ignon/Oudinot Accords. The words and ideas in 
the Accords clearly reflect Tjibaou’s writings and 
philosophy. Effectively postponing an independ-
ence referendum for 10 years, the Accords specifi-
cally refer to ‘a common recognition of the identity 
and dignity of each of the communities present 
in the territory’ (Matignon Texte No 1). While not 
confining the electorate for the referendum to those 
born in New Caledonia, as Tjibaou wanted, the 
electorate was restricted, albeit only to those resi-
dent in New Caledonia in 1988 and their descend-
ants. The Accords provided for a program of eco-
nomic rebalancing over the 10 years, within three 
Provinces, two of which would see a Kanak major-
ity. Nickel processing, up till then confined to the 
European-dominated south, would be developed in 
the mainly Kanak Northern Province, and training 
programs for Kanaks were established.
The Matignon Accords were not perfect. They 
did not recognise the Kanak people, but simply 
spoke about ‘communities’. Tjibaou noted that ‘It’s 
just as difficult for Jacques Lafleur [leader of the 
pro-France mainly white group] to live with this 
handshake as for me’ (Tjibaou 2005, 260). Jacques 
Lafleur told the author in 2003 that he had returned 
to New Caledonia with some trepidation at the task 
of securing his party’s support for what he’d signed 
on to. Tjibaou expressed himself ‘least happy with 
the restricted electorate’ (252). He had argued that 
all those 18 and older with one parent born in the 
territory shared the same ‘fait colonial’ but that 
what had been put forward by the government was 
not the same thing, and Kanaks would not gain a 
majority. He said that ‘many wanted militant action 
to continue’. He had agreed with them ‘that, if they 
had taken tougher action, they may have been able 
to negotiate independence, but not necessarily with 
economically competent people.’ ‘We have both 
decided to build peace, to accept each other as we 
are.’ He told his supporters: ‘During this 10-year 
period we shall try to build the country economi-
cally… We’re gambling on using the economy to 
promote the cultural values that are our own, and 
which allow us to affirm our identity’ (279).
In an interview explaining the logic of the 
Accords, Tjibaou refers once more to the Kanak 
identity, the Kanak view of the ancestors, those 
‘present-absent’ as well as those ‘present’, and 
repeated ‘our basic claims ….  . Acknowledge-
ment of all this, in an all-encompassing form that 
includes the basic demand for independence and 
for recognition of our identity, in its fullest expres-
sion’ (Tjibaou 2005, 268). He refers to the Caldo-
ches as culturally impoverished and unsure of their 
identity. In some circumstances they ‘try to identify 
with us…Its “we” here, but at home they don’t want 
to know us’, and refers to their ‘cultural abyss once 
the “real French” turned up’ (274). He affirms that 
‘We have to promote our nationalism on the basis 
of our culture, to affirm Kanak identity and the 
identity of the country’ (281). 
But with all his explanations and interpreta-
tions, he did not convince everyone. Many FLNKS 
supporters disagreed with the Accords. Less than a 
year after its signature, Tjibaou and his deputy were 
assassinated by a disaffected supporter.
The Future Beyond Tjibaou
Conscious of continued differences and the risk 
of resurgent bloodshed, by 1998, as the Matignon 
Accords neared their endpoint, the principal parties 
once again decided to defer an independence vote, 
this time for 20 years, through the 1998 Noumea 
Accord. This Accord foreshadows a vote from 2014 
to 2018 but in the meantime, sets out a 20-year 
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schedule of handovers of responsibilities to local 
authorities. 
A fundamental difference between the Noumea 
and the Matignon Accords lies in the explicit rec-
ognition, in the Preamble of the Noumea Accord, 
of the existence of the Kanak people, of the ‘shock’ 
of colonisation, of the ‘negation of fundamental ele-
ments of Kanak identity’, of ‘enduring trauma for 
the original people’ whose presence and specific 
identity pre-dated the French in New Caledonia 
and whose identity is linked with the land. It talks 
of decolonisation as ‘the means of … allowing the 
Kanak people to establish new relationships with 
France corresponding to the realities of our times’. 
The Accord provides for the bases of a New Cal-
edonian citizenship, and the construction of a ‘com-
mon destiny’ by the original people with men and 
women living there, a citizenship which will be 
specifically voted on in the promised independ-
ence referendum. It says: ‘The past was the time of 
colonisation. The present is the time of sharing, by 
rebalancing. The future must be the time of iden-
tity, in a common destiny’. These are all ideas draw-
ing from Tjibaou’s discussions of Kanak identity 
and his view of including newcomers in what is 
Kanak land. Specific reference to these issues was 
instrumental in securing the support of the pro-
independence parties. 
Just as Tjibaou’s presence is resonant in this 
document, his prescience has been reflected in its 
implementation so far.
There is no doubt that the Noumea Accord has 
enabled the continuation of peace and prosperity 
for New Caledonia for the last twenty years. Much 
progress has been made in establishing institutions 
and frameworks for unique power sharing between 
the Kanak people and non-Kanak communities of 
New Caledonia (Anaya 2011, Fisher 2012). Howev-
er, it is the identity-related issues that Tjibaou high-
lighted where the biggest differences and concerns 
have emerged:
•     different interpretations of the fundamental 
restricted electorate issue emerged early and 
were only resolved in 2007 after much resistance 
by the French authorities and pro-French parties
•     the French State, disregarding local sensitivities 
over the central idea of ethnic identity, unilat-
erally removed the category of ‘ethnic identity’ 
from the census in 2009, and only after pro-
tests from the pro-independence groups did it 
reinstate such a category, albeit with different 
sub-groups limiting the comparability of figures 
(Fisher 2012, 2013)
•     developing legislation to protect local employment 
rights has been time consuming and difficult
•     there has been a pattern of ethnic tension 
between Kanaks and Wallisians
•     immigration questions still have not been 
resolved. The Noumea Accord is silent on who is 
responsible for immigration, and it is excluded 
from the list of remaining responsibilities that 
will be voted on in an independence referendum
•     environment and land issues have been particu-
larly difficult, reflecting Kanak cultural identi-
fication with the land. It was Kanak opposition 
to environmental practices at the major nickel 
plant in the south, Goro, which led to significant 
delays and greater attention to these issues on 
the part of the major nickel mining companies. 
In May 2014 violence recurred at Saint Louis 
near Noumea, as Kanak clans protested against 
environmental practices at Goro, and included 
the shooting of two gendarmes. The issue of 
land returning to the Kanak people through 
the ADRAF (Agence de developpement rural et 
d’amenagement foncier) has been sensitive, with 
ADRAF’s handover to local authorities sched-
uled for the last phase of the Accord, by January 
2014 (an issue still outstanding in the October 
Meeting of the Committee of Noumea Accord 
signatories, Comite 2013). UN Special Rappor-
teur for the Rights of Indigenous People, James 
Anaya, pointed to continued frustration by 
Kanaks and the lack of a proper land registra-
tion system (2011).
•   ‘identity signs’ such as the name of the country, 
flag, and anthem remain points of contention 
and indeed will be amongst the key areas for 
discussion in coming years. Differences over the 
flag were so intense that they led to the mori-
bundity of the government for much of 2010,9 
and are still not resolved
•     results of economic rebalancing are mixed. 
There has been an increase in percentages of 
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the returns of nickel going to the local govern-
ments. The local share in the huge Northern 
Province Koniambo/Vavouto project is 51 per 
cent, and the local share of the 150 year old 
French plant SLN increased to 34 per cent 
by 2007. But the latter is still far short of the 
sought-after 51 per cent; and the local share of 
the massive Inco Vale project in the south is 
only 5 per cent. While there has been considera-
ble French investment in new infrastructure and 
projects at Goro in the south and Koniambo in 
the north, neither of these new plants is produc-
ing at planned capacity, and a long-promised 
strategic survey of the resource has still not 
been completed. Imported labour was used in 
construction and few Kanaks are employed in 
managerial positions
•     progress on educating and employing Kanaks 
in senior positions has been slow. Responsibil-
ity for primary and secondary education has 
passed to local authority, but Kanak achieve-
ment of the Baccalaureat has remained low — 
23 per cent of candidates in 2009 compared to 
69 per cent Europeans (Nouvelles calédoniennes, 
March 2010) — and the special 400 cadres 
program designed to train Kanaks has failed to 
ensure Kanak managers and professionals.10
•     confusion of identity continues amongst young 
Kanaks, many of whom are unemployed and 
aimless. Young Kanaks can be seen roaming 
the central squares and squats of Noumea. They 
take refuge in music and drugs. The anthropolo-
gist Pillon refers to their ethnic identity being 
rejected by the dominant European society at the 
same time as their ‘urban’ identity is stigmatised 
by their community of origin (Pillon 1999, 69).
With the 2014 deadline of handovers upon us, 
differences remain about critical transfers, of so-
called Article 27 powers, including administrative 
rules relating to the Provinces and Communes, ter-
tiary education, and audiovisual communications.11 
Tjibaou’s plan of developing economic competence 
among Kanaks so that they can participate fully 
in decisions about their country’s resources has 
not yet been realised. More importantly, the way 
in which many issues (for example, the restricted 
electorate and the census ethnic category) were 
handled undermined Kanak confidence that the 
French understood their expectations flowing from 
the idea of the parole, keeping one’s word by taking 
appropriate action.
Pointers For the Future
Tjibaou’s notions of ethnic identity continue to 
provide guidance, as New Caledonia prepares for 
the last phase of the Noumea Accord. This involves 
discussions about a referendum process which is 
to focus on the last five sovereign responsibilities 
(defence, foreign affairs, civil law, justice, and cur-
rency); New Caledonian citizenship and national-
ity; and New Caledonia’s international status. 
The May 2014 provincial elections delivered 
a pro-France majority more divided and slimmer 
than ever before (29 of 54 Congress seats). While 
the component parties have different views about a 
referendum process, they are united on one thing: 
that New Caledonia will remain with France. 
The pro-independence side managed to 
overcome their own divisions to attain their 
strongest representation to date (25 seats). It is 
significant that, at least for public consumption, 
in their formal election campaign statements all 
but one of the pro-independence parties now talk 
of ‘full sovereignty’ or ‘full emancipation’ rather 
than ‘independence’.12 While some leaders may 
talk of independence to Kanak audiences, there is 
a clear will amongst the main groups to avoid the 
use of the ‘I’ word publicly, no doubt with a view 
to maintaining stability given the recent bloody 
past, but also, nonetheless, with an eye to the 
negotiations about the future now under way.
This evolution in the thinking of Kanak politi-
cal leaders about sovereignty, independence and 
identity issues has been evident over the course of 
implementation of the Noumea Accord. They have 
increasingly talked about ‘recognition of identity’, 
‘decolonisation’ and ‘full accession to sovereignty’ 
rather more than independence, but all only on 
the basis that everyone fulfills their commitments 
under the Noumea Accord (adhering to the parole, 
putting it into action). 
The principal Kanak political leaders today 
have not been voluble or prolific in expressing their 
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views. Principally they do so in occasional inter-
views. And Tjibaou’s abiding influence is evident. 
In November 2013, Paul Néaoutyine — Northern 
Province President and leader of the pro-independ-
ence Palika party, a member of FLNKS — said that 
for 38 years Palika’s ‘objective is to have recognised 
the identity of our people and to lead the fight to 
end the colonial system and have the Kanak people 
accede to independence’ (Néaoutyine 2013). 
But his idea of ‘independence’ seems more 
nuanced. In 2009, he specified as his priority to ‘seek 
out other citizens from non-Kanak communities…
to share with them the formidable construction of a 
common destiny’ (Néaoutyine 2009). Repeating this 
message in 2013, he noted that the mission of Palika 
is ‘to convince Caledonians that independence or 
full sovereignty is not a spectre, it is the situation 
of 95 per cent of the country at the moment. Why 
not take responsibility to take the [next] step?’ He 
adds in the same interview ‘[we want to] perfect 
living together because many of the responsibilities 
have not really been exercised and rebalancing has 
not yet finished…We have entered into a process of 
decolonisation, to be complete with the accession to 
full sovereignty. We continue to make Caledonian 
citizens believe that it’s possible to stay in statutory 
links with France’— but only if commitments 
are met. In an interview in 2009 he premised the 
discussions on the post-Accord issues on ‘the 
achievement of the transfers of responsibilities’ by 
2014; and at the end of 2013 he indicated that not 
all transfers had been completed (Néaoutyine 2009, 
2013). Néaoutyine has emphasised the diversity of 
views amongst the pro-independence side, albeit 
with unity over the essentials, such as the restricted 
electorate, the transfers of responsibilities, the North 
nickel plant, and identity signs (Néaoutyine 2009). 
These elements are all at the heart of Kanak identity, 
and resonate with the thinking of Tjibaou.
Charles Washetine, Palika Politbureau member, 
has talked about ‘playing the game [of the Noumea 
Accord] to its conclusion’, provided that all sides 
fulfil their commitments (Washetine 24 February 
2009). This reflects Tjibaou’s own perspective, with 
its ominous foreshadowing of what might hap-
pen if others do not fulfill their commitments: in 
one of his last interviews, in January 1989, he said: 
‘The FLNKS is not married to the 10 years, but it 
will stick to it if the others stick to it. The minute 
the partners drop it, we ask for independence, we 
don’t ask for 10 years. We stopped the disturbance 
because of the Accord’ (Tjibaou 2005, 284).
Tjibaou’s specific idea of Kanaky choosing 
relationships with other countries continues to 
inform statements by Néaoutyine, who has spoken 
about New Caledonia choosing links with France 
or any other country (2006), and by FLNKS 
spokesman Victor Tutogoro, who has argued that 
independence and sovereignty meant the capacity 
to choose one’s own interdependencies, to choose 
with whom one wanted to work and exchange 
(Nouvelles Calédoniennes 2008). 
Tjibaou’s idea of Kanaks developing economic 
competence over the period of the Matignon 
Accords also lives on. In his capacity as president of 
the mainly Kanak Northern Province, Néaoutyine 
takes pains to point out that in successfully 
administering the Northern Province he and other 
Kanaks have demonstrated that they can manage a 
province, and a country (2013).
French analyses too draw on Tjibaou’s ideas. 
In October 2013 the Committee of Signatories to 
the Accord released a discussion paper on options 
for New Caledonia’s future prepared by French 
Counsellor of State Jean Courtial and law professor 
Ferdinand Melin-Soucramanien. The document 
does not address the idea of deferring a vote yet 
again, although does point to legal technicalities 
allowing a vote as late as 2022 (not 2018 as 
originally agreed) (Courtial et al. 2013, 62). It 
poses four options: full sovereignty, sovereignty in 
partnership with France, expanded autonomy and 
continued limited autonomy. 
Tjibaou’s enduring presence is reflected in the 
paper. Very early the authors address the idea of a 
‘common destiny’, citing the Noumea Accord itself: 
‘The past was the time of colonisation. The present 
is the time of sharing, by rebalancing. The future 
must be the time of identity, in a common destiny’ 
(Preamble 14). 
Recognising the importance of whether or not 
the commitments under the Accord have been 
implemented before all parties can agree on the 
future, the paper specifically says that it is not its 
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task to evaluate the decolonisation process or the 
rebalancing policy, or whether the construction of 
identity is under way. Later when evaluating the 
‘expanded autonomy’ option, the authors refer to 
‘the thorny question of whether holding a referen-
dum on accession to full sovereignty is predicated on 
the transfer of … responsibilities’ (that is, the Article 
27 responsibilities); and later devote an entire sec-
tion to evaluating this question (Courtial et al. 2013, 
54, 80–81). The paper notes the lack of equality for 
Kanaks13 and the inability to agree on identity signs, 
and analyses various options of ‘Caledonian citizen-
ship’ for the future, in or outside of France, recognis-
ing that ‘these questions are absolutely decisive for 
the institutional future of New Caledonia’ and for its 
relations with France (14–15). As noted earlier, ideas 
about Caledonian citizenship are fundamental iden-
tity issues identified by Tjibaou. 
In words that could be Tjibaou’s, the authors 
write, ‘A socio-political community of citizens 
not constituting a State defines itself in relation to 
others from that State, to those who do not belong 
to that community’ (Courtial et al. 2013, 16). They 
reflect Tjibaou’s thinking on identity when they 
identify ‘markers’ of exclusion or inclusion (control 
of immigration, access to local employment, 
business and professional rights) and other 
symbolic ‘markers’ (a language, identity signs such 
as flag and name, institutions of representation 
to the outside community) which mean nothing 
if ‘the community does not really exist by itself ’: 
‘the essence is the common feeling of belonging 
to the same community, the identification of the 
peoples concerned with that community’, a ‘real 
community which feels itself as such’ (17). But the 
authors then proceed to judge that such a ‘feeling 
of belonging and the sense of sharing a common 
destiny had only been partly solidified over the 
three quarter-period of the Accord’ to date (18) — 
a highly controversial statement with implications 
for the discussions now under way. They note that 
the sensitive restricted electorate for provincial 
elections could not continue after the Accord, and 
are ascerbic in pointing to lack of agreement over a 
name of a country or a flag (19). Such judgements 
have led to scathing criticism from one academic at 
the University of New Caledonia (Chauchat 2013).
In their consideration of alternatives for the 
future, the authors refer explicitly to Tjibaou’s idea 
of the freedom to choose partners. In the case of 
full sovereignty, they refer to the reality of sover-
eign States ‘more often engaged in relations of more 
or less narrow interdependences’ and cite Tjibaou’s 
1985 article ‘Our identity is ahead of us’: ‘For a small 
country like ours, independence is choosing our 
interdependencies skillfully’ (Courtial et al. 2013, 
23). In the case of sovereignty in partnership with 
France, they refer to Tjibaou’s formula: ‘the partner-
ship of sovereign States is the voluntary choice by 
these States of their own interdependencies’ (36).
When discussing sovereignty in partnership with 
France, the paper rather worryingly notes, ‘To evoke 
a common language and culture is not to deny the 
Kanak identity and culture, the existence of Kanak 
languages, no more than the identity, culture and 
languages of other communities living in the coun-
try’ (Courtial et al. 2013, 39). This acknowledges 
the importance of Kanak identity but seems to miss 
Tjibaou’s point about the primacy of Kanak culture 
and identity over those of newcomers such as the 
French, including the Caldoches, the Wallisians, the 
ni-Vanuatu, Vietnamese and Indonesians.
And in addressing the ‘existing autonomy’ 
or status quo option, the authors weigh carefully 
options around Caledonian citizenship based on 
the Accord’s provision for the translation of a ‘com-
munity of chosen destiny’, one of Tjibaou’s ideas 
(Courtial et al. 65–66). In its discussion of the con-
tinuation of ‘consensus government’ as currently 
applies under the Accord, the paper includes the 
idea of ‘an institutional identity unique to New Cal-
edonia’ and a ‘ Pacific’ solution as possibly being 
appropriate (72), ideas reminiscent of Tjibaou’s.
There has been remarkably little public reaction 
or specific comment from Kanak political leaders 
on the French paper, not even during the early 2014 
election campaign. This is not an unusual state of 
affairs, but silence would be mistaken for agree-
ment. As Tjibaou himself symbolised throughout 
his life, and as he explicitly warned, in 1988: 
Kanaks never say no — it’s bad manners, 
it’s not civilised. .. With Europeans, if you 
fall out, they send you packing, but with us 
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm                                                                                                 13 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2014/4
very often we’ll just keep quiet. And then the 
Whites think we’ve agreed with them. 
(Tjibaou 2005, 276).
And, while Kanak political leaders have been 
reticent, a major paper has been released by the 
Kanak clan chiefs as members of the Customary 
Senate. This institution was established by the 
Noumea Accord, and consists of the customary 
chiefs and representatives of the eight customary 
areas. While these chiefdoms were historically 
established and appointed by the French, the chiefs 
are clan chiefs and accepted as senior Kanak elders. 
The Customary Senate is obliged to provide advice 
on all legislation and judicial proceedings touching 
on Kanak customary issues. 
On 20 June 2014, a paper called The Charter of 
the Kanak People: a common base of values and fun-
damental principles of Kanak civilisation was pre-
sented to the New Caledonia Congress by the Cus-
tomary Senate. It had been released to Kanak chiefs 
and councils at a prominent cultural centre, Ko We 
Kara, on 26 April 2014, just days before the provin-
cial elections (11 May 2014). It presents itself as a 
formal Kanak contribution to the beginning of the 
discussions about the post-Accord future, and fol-
lowed a process of consultations amongst the clans 
throughout 2013. It is in some ways a counterpart to 
the French paper. As it says, ‘This Charter is at the 
end of the Noumea Accord process the contribution 
of the Kanak indigenous people to the construction 
of a new plan for society. The Charter of the Kanak 
people is what we carry to the basket of negotiations 
on the post-Noumea Accord’ (31).
Once again, Tjibaou’s influence is evident. The 
Charter begins, in its Introduction, with the same 
Noumea Accord reference made by the French 
paper in its Preamble 14 (‘The past was the time of 
colonisation. The present is the time of sharing, by 
rebalancing. The future must be the time of identity, 
in a common destiny’) (Sénat Coutumier 2014, 6). 
It begins with historical ideas about the Melanesian 
people then moves to the Kanak clans and the 
traumatisation of colonisation (3–4). In an inclusive 
way, it specifically endorses the role of Christianity 
in transforming and consistent with Kanak 
spirituality (5). In its Preamble, reflecting Tjibaou’s 
inclusivity, the Charter situates Kanak identity 
within a common destiny and identity (7). While 
enumerating the continued inequalities suffered 
by the Kanak people, it refers to the 2007 UN 
Declaration of Indigenous Rights and the ‘double- 
exercise’ of the right of self-determination, both of 
the Kanak people and of New Caledonia under UN 
Resolution 1514 decolonisation principles (8). The 
Charter claims to give the Kanak people ‘a superior 
judicial framework embracing a historical reality, in 
fact, and guaranteeing its unity and the expression 
of its inherent sovereignty’, and pledges to affirm 
‘a cooperative and balanced judicial pluralism 
to allow the implementation of the Values and 
Principles of the Charter in sectors and institutions 
of society’. This is all part of a ‘prerequisite and 
incontrovertible contribution’ to the construction of 
a common destiny (9).
The substance of the paper itself reflects even 
more of Tjibaou’s thought, when it elaborates on 
characteristics of Kanak identity, their values and 
civilization ranging from the sacredness of life, the 
word, the link to the land, the yam, consensus, and 
relationships with others whereby ‘a Kanak person 
is always referenced to his social group’ (Sénat 
Coutumier 2014, 10–11 and subsequent chapters). 
The use of these identity traits as a political 
construct in the tradition of Tjiabou continues. 
There is an extensive discussion of the right of self-
determination of the Kanak people. Nowhere does 
the paper use the word ‘independence’. Instead, 
conciliatory concepts are advanced: the paper talks 
of the ‘sovereignty’ of the Kanak people, with the 
right to self determination being exercised ‘at an 
internal level’, resting on a principle of ‘joint and 
shared sovereignty’ with ‘no breach of the ter-
ritorial integrity of the [French] State’ (24). ‘The 
Kanak people, their customary authorities and their 
institutions, freely determine the level of their par-
ticipation and contribution in the management of 
the [French] State and [New Caledonia] Territory 
institutions and the degree of their cooperation 
with these institutions’ (24) ‘Each individual Kanak 
freely determines the level of his participation in 
the [French] State institutions through the exercise 
of his citizenship rights’. The authors are firm, how-
ever, that, ‘all participation or cooperation of the 
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Kanak people and its component parts can no longer 
be conceived other than with institutions respectful 
of the principle and values affirmed in this Charter 
and on the basis of relationships freed from all form 
of discrimination and subjection’ (24).
In this context, the Charter announces the 
formation of a Kanak People’s Assembly consisting 
of the chiefdoms and districts of the eight customary 
areas, who are ‘the only traditional and legitimate 
representatives of the Kanak people of New Caledonia 
and constitute the Kanak People’s Assembly’ (25). 
The Assembly is charged to exercise the attributes 
of indigenous Kanak sovereignty until a new 
social contract will be established with the other 
component [peoples] of New Caledonia. The Charter 
commissions this Assembly to ‘organize and reinforce 
Kanak sovereignty and…redefine a mutually 
acceptable framework of relations between the Kanak 
people and the French State and the territory of New 
Caledonia’ (25). The Charter calls on all State and 
territory Authorities to implement the Charter and 
the international community, and specifically, the 
Pacific countries and people, to support it (26).
In a related Solemn Message of the Custom-
ary Senate to the Kanak area Councils on 12 April 
2014, the authors note that the Charter is not ‘fixed 
in marble. We propose to give it life’ (30). ‘This step 
is an undertaking at the end of the Noumea Accord 
process. It should, or could, stand on its own, as 
we realize today that citizenship and the common 
destiny can only be built if we correctly reposition 
indigenous Kanak rights’ (30). ‘Our Charter opens 
the way to innovation and creativity in all areas. 
It opens the way to negotiation … . Adopting the 
Charter should permit the opening of new paths for 
dialogue. We will be able, thanks to the Charter, to 
renegotiate the public Kanak policies that we have 
never been able to achieve until the present.’(30) ‘But 
first and foremost, the adoption of this Charter must 
be a detonator, or a spark in the clans and chiefdoms 
allowing for a reappropriation of our rights, in each 
territory or customary zone of influence’(30).
It is of some interest that in these important 
days of preparing for discussion of the post-Noumea 
Accord, it is the Kanak customary elders that are 
providing the mouthpiece, rather than the pro-inde-
pendence political leaders (although there is some 
overlap, Rock Wamytan for example being a clan 
chief as well as the head of the FLNKS group in 
the south). No doubt one motivation is that Kanak 
supporters of independence want to reinforce the 
placement of Kanak identity front and centre in the 
political discussions for the future.
In closing, at this important juncture in the 
history of New Caledonia, where the people who 
live there are in the process of defining their future 
identity, it is worthwhile reminding ourselves of 
some of Tjibaou’s words and his synthesis of past, 
present and future, and his ideas of inclusion. There 
are warning signs. As he often repeated ‘To accept 
autonomy [as opposed to independence] is to 
walk on the graves of our ancestors’ (Tjibaou 2005, 
xxxii). As he noted:
I am transient but must do my utmost to 
ensure that the country I leave for my sons 
will be the most beautiful country, one where 
there is wealth, wealth of thought, wisdom, 
flowers and nourishment…abundance..self-
sufficiency No matter where you are, you 
have the same responsibility towards the cur-
rent and future generations (291–92).
And in his very last speech before his death, in 
May 1989, referring to the blood of those who had 
gone, he enjoined us to ‘remembering not to forget’: 
‘we have a duty not to forget’ (295). 
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Endnotes
1 While there had been a history of differences over 
Brot’s handling of such issues, the immediate trigger 
was a visit by the French Overseas Territories Minister 
and the announcement of a special mission to visit 
New Caledonia to address post-Noumea Accord 
discussions (les Nouvelles Calédoniennes  
19 July 2014).
2 Although some Kanaks were able to vote from 1945 
(war veterans, pastors and customary chiefs), it was 
only in 1956 that all native residents of the overseas 
territories were entitled to vote.
3 New Caledonia nickel reserves, representing about 
30–40 per cent of world reserves, are the third-largest 
in the world (see Angleviel 2003).
4 French Prime Minister and former DOM-TOM 
Minister Pierre Messmer wrote to his DOM-TOM 
secretary of state on 17 July 1972 that indigenous 
nationalist claims could only be avoided if residents 
coming from metropolitan France, or from elsewhere 
in Overseas France, became the demographic majority 
(‘À long terme, la revendication nationaliste autochtone 
ne sera evitée que si les communautés allogènes 
représentent une masse démographique majoritaire’ in 
Sanguinetti 1985, 26). 
5 The author cites Tjibaou’s various works and 
interviews from the collection translated into English 
and published by Helen Fraser and John Trotter in 
2005. For ease of reading, the citation will appear as 
(Tjibaou 2005 and page number) using only page 
numbers for successive references within any one 
paragraph. 
6 Marie-Claude Tjibaou said that everyone defined their 
unity while being very diverse : «chacun s’est affirmé 
dans son unité tout en étant très divers : les Ajie c’est 
les Ajie, les Paici c’est les Paici, les Drehu c’est les 
Drehu... On est quand même bien particulier. Même 
au niveau du faciès des gens on voit bien que l’on est 
différent mais on vibrait de la même chose » (revue 
MwàVéé 10, septembre 1995, 20).
7 Tjibaou was invited to speak to the University of 
Geneva on ‘The Melanesians of yesterday and today’. 
As Eric Waddell points out, this was a distinction 
his people did not make, rather ‘the Melanesian 
community is a continuously unfolding experience 
where time past, time present, and time future are all 
part of a distinctive whole’ (Waddell 2008, 96–97).
8 Tjibaou himself refers to this, noting in 1985 that 
Europeans and other non-Kanaks working with 
independentists ‘are 7% of our strength. Or 10 % 
depending on the area’ and ‘Melanesians [Kanaks] on 
the white side: 10 or 15%’ (Tjibaou 2005, 150).
9 The Accord/related Organic Law provides for the 
‘government’ (Cabinet) to dissolve if one of the 
members resigns. In February 2011, the UC member 
resigned over decisions made to fly two flags (the 
French and the FLNKS flag) in preparation for a visit 
by the French Prime Minister in mid-2010, triggering 
a series of re-elections and resignations stultifying 
government for months until rules about the effects of 
resignation were revised in legislation, leaving the flag 
issue suspended.
10 UN Special Rapporteur Anaya in 2011 cites damning 
results: ‘There are no Kanak lawyers, judges, 
university lecturers, police chiefs or doctors, and 
there are only six Kanak midwives registered with the 
State health system, out of a total of 300 midwives in 
New Caledonia’ (Anaya 2011).
11 Article 27 of the 1999 Organic Law implementing the 
1998 Noumea Accord provides that ‘The Congress 
can, from the beginning of its 2009 mandate, adopt a 
resolution for the transfer, by a further Organic Law, 
of the following responsibilities: Rules relating to the 
administration and legal control of the provinces, 
communes and their public establishments, and 
accounting and financial system for the public 
collectivities and their public establishments; tertiary 
education; audiovisual [televised] communication.’
12 During the campaign, in formal summaries of 
their positions, Palika leader Paul Néaoutyine (7 
seats) proposes ‘Caledonian citizenship, with a 
voluntary step to full emancipation…for equal and 
sovereign relations with France and all other free 
nations’; FLNKS leader Roch Wamytan (6 seats) 
‘full sovereignty…in today’s realities…ready for 
cooperation agreements, even management of certain 
responsibilities, with France and Europe as with 
other regional countries’, with his Rainbow Coalition 
calling for ‘access to full sovereignty, nationhood and 
the exercise of the sovereign powers’ ; the Dynamique 
autochtone (1 seat) also assuming full sovereignty, 
supporting a ‘delegation of sovereignty’ wherever 
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the sovereign country would not have the capacity 
to exercise sovereignty’; the UC-FLNKS (9 seats) 
favours full application of the Noumea Accord 
including on the three main referendum questions, a 
position shared by the small Union pour construire 
les Loyautés (1 seat). The standout remains the left 
wing Labour Party (1 seat), whose leader Louis 
Kotra Uregei refers to creating conditions whereby 
independence supporters would obtain the majority, 
after which it would control the country, culminating 
in independence.
13 The paper cites one review of the Accord showing that 
‘despite advances in favour of Kanaks, social policies 
have not yet created a true equality of opportunity in 
academic achievement and access to the employment 
market’ (footnote in Courtial et al. 2013, 15).
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